The Conversation

Don’t write off the Putin–Trump summit just yet

Peter Rutland, Wesleyan University

Like many such encounters, the Aug. 15, 2025, Alaska red-carpet rollout for Russian President Vladimir Putin is classic Donald Trump: diplomacy as pageantry, emerging seemingly out of nowhere, with vague goals and hardened expectations from both supporters and opponents before it even happens.

Trump has billed the meeting as a “feel-out” session aimed at exploring a diplomatic end to the more than three-year-old Russian war in Ukraine. It follows a phase in which he criticized Putin more sharply, giving him a 50-day deadline to end the war or face new U.S. sanctions. He later reversed course on military support, stepping up arms shipments – while maintaining that repairing U.S.–Russia ties remains his priority.

Critics note the summit format excludes Ukraine and its European allies. Military scholar Lawrence Freedman has voiced fears Trump will concede to Putin’s core demands for a ceasefire. CNN’s Nick Paton Walsh similarly warned it’s hard to see how such a bilateral deal wouldn’t “eviscerate Ukraine.” Most mainstream commentators in the U.S. and Europe share this skepticism. One exception is Anatole Lieven of the anti-interventionist Quincy Institute, who offered cautious support.

In Moscow, the pro-government press hails the summit as a victory for Putin and a “catastrophe for Kyiv,” as the MK newspaper put it – despite Trump’s vague hints of a “land swap” that could let Ukraine regain some lost territory.

Still, respected Russian émigré journalist Tatyana Stanovaya calls this the “first more or less real attempt to stop the war.” Several developments could give Trump more leverage now than in earlier, failed efforts. [Abridged]

Seven months into his second term, Trump has shown greater readiness to project power abroad. In June, he backed Israel’s airstrikes on Iran, a key Russian ally in the Middle East. On Aug. 8, he hosted Armenia and Azerbaijan at the White House to sign a peace deal – a blow to Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus.

Trump’s global trade war is also unsettling Moscow. On Aug. 7, he slapped punitive tariffs on 90 countries missing his deal deadline. The day before announcing the Alaska summit, he imposed 50% tariffs on India – unless it cuts Russian oil imports within 21 days. As India bought $80 billion of Russian oil last year, this could pinch Moscow’s revenues.

Yet there are reasons for doubt. India may shrug off the tariff threat, as key exports to the U.S. are exempt. And Russia could redirect oil to China, Turkey, or others. Even a $10–20 billion loss wouldn’t cripple a government budget exceeding $400 billion.

The biggest obstacle is territorial. Russia doesn’t fully control all four Ukrainian provinces it claims. If Moscow insists on complete control, Ukraine would face ceding major cities like Kramatorsk and Slovyansk – a step President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is unlikely to accept. Putin, for his part, has declared the provinces “forever” part of Russia.

Other issues – from Ukraine’s security guarantees to Russia’s “denazification” demands – could be deferred to later talks. Both societies are weary of war, but neither wants peace at any price. If Trump could secure a concession on territory, Zelenskyy might consider it – but Putin would expect sanctions relief in return.

Given Putin’s apparent confidence, he may see little reason to compromise. But if a deal emerges in Alaska, it could reshape the conflict’s trajectory.

[Abridged]

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