Daniel Treisman, UCLA
President Donald Trump’s critics often accuse him of harboring authoritarian ambitions. Journalists and scholars have drawn parallels between his leadership style and that of strongmen abroad. Some Democrats warn the U.S. is sliding toward autocracy – a system in which one leader holds unchecked power.
Others counter that labeling Trump an autocrat is alarmist. He hasn’t suspended the Constitution or executed rivals, as dictators like Augusto Pinochet or Saddam Hussein once did.
But modern autocrats don’t always resemble their 20th-century predecessors. Instead, they avoid overt violence and speak the language of democracy. They wear suits, hold elections, and talk about the will of the people. Rather than terrorizing citizens, many use media control and messaging to shape opinion and promote nationalist narratives. Many gain power not through military coups but through elections.
In the early 2000s, political scientist Andreas Schedler coined the term “electoral authoritarianism” to describe regimes that hold elections without real competition. Scholars Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way use “competitive authoritarianism” for systems in which opposition parties exist but leaders undermine them through censorship, electoral fraud or legal manipulation.
In my own work with economist Sergei Guriev, we explore a broader strategy modern autocrats use. We call this “informational autocracy” or “spin dictatorship.” These leaders don’t rely on violence but craft the illusion that they are competent, democratic defenders of the nation.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán exemplifies this. He first served from 1998 to 2002, returned to power in 2010, and has since won three more elections after campaigns criticized as intimidating and xenophobic. He preserved Hungary’s formal democratic structures but hollowed them out.
In his first two years, Orbán packed Hungary’s constitutional court with loyalists, forced judges off the bench, and rewrote the constitution to limit judicial review. He tightened control over the media, funneled state advertising to friendly outlets, and shut down Hungary’s largest opposition newspaper after an ally acquired it.
He targeted advocacy groups and universities. A law penalizing foreign-accredited institutions forced the Central European University to relocate to Vienna in 2020. Yet Orbán has mostly avoided violence. His appeal rests on a narrative that Hungary is under siege – by immigrants, liberal elites and foreign influences – and that only he can defend its sovereignty and identity.
Variants of spin dictatorship have appeared in Singapore, Malaysia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Leaders such as Hugo Chávez and early Vladimir Putin consolidated power with minimal violence.
Our research shows political killings and imprisonments by autocrats declined significantly from the 1980s to the 2010s. In a globalized world, overt repression has costs – sanctions, lost investment, and reduced innovation.
Still, spin dictators may revert to traditional tactics in crises. Putin has cracked down violently in Russia. Regimes like North Korea and China continue to rule through fear and surveillance.
Most experts agree the U.S. remains a democracy. But some of Trump’s tactics – attacking the press, defying court rulings, admiring strongmen – resemble those of informational autocrats. Democracy depends not just on leaders’ restraint but on the power of institutions to hold them accountable.
Wealthy democracies like the U.S. benefit from strong institutions – media, courts, advocacy groups – that act as checks on power. The U.S. Constitution is harder to amend than Hungary’s, offering another safeguard. Its decentralized federal system also makes it difficult for any one leader to dominate.
But the global rise of spin dictatorships should sharpen awareness. Around the world, autocrats have learned to control their citizens by faking democracy. Understanding their techniques may help Americans preserve the real thing.
[Abridged]
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