As war in Ukraine enters a 5th year, will the ‘Putin consensus’ among Russians hold?

Peter Rutland, Professor of Government, Wesleyan University

Perceived wisdom has it that the longer a war goes on, the less enthusiastic a public becomes for continuing the conflict. After all, it is ordinary citizens who tend to bear the economic and human costs.

And yet, as the war following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 enters its fifth year, the attitude of the Russian public remains difficult to gauge: Just over half of Russians, according to one recent poll, expect the war to end in 2026; yet a majority say that should negotiations fail, Moscow needs to “escalate” with greater use of force.

As observers of Russian society, we believe this ambiguity in Russian public opinion gives President Vladimir Putin the cover to continue pushing hard for his goals in Ukraine. Yet at the same time, a deeper dive into the Russian public’s apparent support for the war suggests that it is more fragile than the Russian president would like to believe.

From Day 1 of the conflict, Western strategy has been predicated on the belief that economic sanctions would eventually cause either the Russian elite or its society to persuade Putin to abandon the war.

This, in turn, is based on the assumption that the legitimacy of Putinism rests on a social contract of sorts: The Russian people will be loyal to the Kremlin if they enjoy a stable standard of living and are allowed to pursue their private lives without interference from the state.

The Russian economy has been struggling since 2014, so many analysts believed that this social contract was coming under strain even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, after four years of war, the combination of exclusion from European markets and a tripling of military spending has led to economic stagnation and mounting pressure on living standards.

One problem with the social contract approach is that it tends to downplay the role of ideology.

It is possible that Putin’s “Make Russia Great Again” propaganda resonates with a significant part of the Russian public. Polling has consistently placed Putin’s approval rating above 80% since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict.

Of course, the validity of the results of polls in an authoritarian society at war cannot be taken at face value. Yet, one shouldn’t rule out that some of that support is genuine and rests not just on a stable economy but also on popular endorsement of Putin’s pledge to restore Russia’s power and influence on the world stage.

The Kremlin has tried to hide the costs of the war from the public: concealing the true death toll and avoiding full-scale mobilization of conscripts by recruiting highly paid volunteers. It is also trying to keep the economy stable by drawing down the country’s reserve funds.

That leaves open the question of whether the “Putin consensus” will break down at some point in the future if the costs of the war start to hit home for a majority of Russians.

Heading into the Ukraine war’s fifth year, the gulf between the Kremlin version of reality and the lived experience of ordinary Russians remains. It echoes a pattern we have seen before: In the final decade of the Soviet Union the Kremlin became increasingly out of touch with the views of its people.

History will not necessarily repeat itself – but the masters of the Kremlin should be conscious of the parallels.

[Abridged]