Paulo Barbosa
All of those statements seem to show an unwillingness from China to develop towards a model that upholds the major provisions of the Basic Law(s) in Hong Kong and Macau, namely the separation of powers (whereby the executive and the judiciary form separate branches), freedom of speech as a basic human right, and the consequent non-criminalization of dissent.
The latest statements indicate that some of China’s top officials deem the universal values embodied in the “rule of law” principle to be “Western-style” concepts. Those officials go as far as to say that those values are remnants of colonialism. And they do not clearly explain what alternative they would propose. They don’t need to. Their alternative is being implemented, with known results.
Perhaps the most puzzling statements of this nature were the subject of the South China Morning Post (SCMP)’s main headline at the beginning of this month. One of the planners of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, Ou Xiaoli, went to a conference in Hong Kong to say that he was “skeptical about Hong Kong’s ambition to form a bridge between the mainland and the rest of the world, because many countries along the ‘One Belt, One Road’ corridor did not do business in the Western style that the city was accustomed to.” During his speech, which was observed by HKSAR chief executive CY Leung, he argued that the region’s strategy and strengths –
including the rule of law – wouldn’t be efficient in Central Asia, and that Hong Kong should enhance cooperation with Guangdong to set up creative parks (where have I heard this one before?). “The ways of doing business and systems in many of the countries along ‘One belt, One Road’ are more similar to that one of mainland and Russia,” Ou Xiaoli commented.
(At this point, and although it is a side issue to the main point of this column, I must say that I’m always intrigued when I hear about the “One Belt, One Road” strategy. Philip Stephens summarized this sentiment well in the Financial Times: “Everyone in China is talking about President Xi Jinping’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative. No one seems to know precisely what it means.” According to the SCMP, “the plan is seen as the Chinese version of the Marshall Plan”…)
Ou Xiaoli was not alone in raising concerns about Beijing’s interpretation of the “One country, two systems” principle. The director of the PRC’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong, Zhang Xiaoming, said that the chief executive in Hong Kong holds a “special legal position,” presiding above the executive, judiciary and legislative branches.
Another speech that stirred controversy was made by a former senior official of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, Chen Zhuoer, who said that “colonial holdovers” are one of the causes of Hong Kong’s economic and political problems. Consequently, he indicated that these holdovers needed to be eliminated. Once again, no one knows precisely what he meant by this.
According to the Asia Sentinel, “The underlying reality is that Beijing believes whatever the Basic Law says, all power ultimately derives from the center, which itself is controlled by the party. Separation of powers is alien to it, particularly at this moment when president Xi Jinping is focused on the twin themes of party discipline and nationalism.”
People in Hong Kong and Macau should follow with curiosity – and perhaps concern – whatever new interpretations of the basic laws are made by Beijing officials.
Obviously, the SARs’ mini-constitutions are not susceptible to all kinds of interpretations and developments. If Beijing cannot understand that, it will deviate from the final goal that explains why the SARs were created and will exist at least until 2047 (HK) and 2049 (Macau): the peaceful reunification with Taiwan.
No Comments