Leanda Lee
The Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge (HKZMB) has long been proposed (2002), planned (from 2004) and contracts signed (2009). It has long been in development, long been seen under construction from the air and eastern vantage points of Macau, and not long to go before the re-scheduled and again rescheduled opening. The strange thing about this highly complex bridge project is that to the general population the business case is as murky as the Delta itself.
This week’s comments from Victor Lei, managing director of the International Logistics and Forwarding Association of Macau as representative figure of the logistics industry, suggests that even those who should most benefit from the mega-size sea crossing are being kept (well, “high and dry” would be an inept idiom given the circumstances) hanging.
We are informed that the functions of the bridge are three-fold: 1) “to meet the demand of passenger and freight land transport among Hong Kong, the Mainland […] and Macao”, 2) “to establish a new land transport link between the east and west banks of the Pearl River”, and 3) “to enhance the economic and sustainable development of the three places.”
What we have not seen and what people like Victor Lei are having problems with is bridging the gap between these motherhood statements heard for last fifteen-odd years and the explicit details of 1) what the projected demand was to justify this complex 35.6-kilometre multi-billion dollar mega-project and what the permitted utilization and carrying capacity will be, 2) the cost to the various users and how it will enhance their specific business models and individual needs – particularly given that building metaphorical bridges with Macau’s logistics industry to consult on their specific requirements appears to have been unsuccessful – and 3) what is really meant by “economic” and “sustainable” and in what way will each region uniquely benefit from the infrastructure over time?
Perhaps the authorities thought they would cross that bridge when they came to it. The bridge is now there, right in front of us, and although somewhat tardy, it is time to have clarified the details as to why it is there, specifically, for whom, and what quantifiable outcomes were anticipated.
A simple case in question is the individual resident travelling between Macau and Hong Kong. There are a number of criteria we check to make these decisions that are mostly to do with resources: how much time, money, effort and habitual change will be asked of us to traverse that expanse of water? The mode and method will depend upon the time of day, point of origin and ultimate destination. Monetary cost, both to obtain the ongoing permit and for each trip, has been an ongoing question in community conversation. Then there are the hassle factors such as traffic on the bridge, and to and from the bridge. What of the frequency of services and the consistency of schedules? How will traffic impact upon these? Comfort and even fear factors play a role: trust that construction? get queasy on the Cotai Jet? can’t get enough of those TurboJet hotdogs?
Has all this been considered and market research actually done, or was it as case of taking a page out of Adelson’s “build it and they will come” book? Recent news about the logistics facility in Macau being put out to tender, customs agreements not finalized, and only very recent indications of toll fees suggest that operational matters were inconsequential.
Burning bridges I may be, but bridging the gap between the unfathomable business case and the actual construction of this technological feat of a bridge lies in a more authentic justification: political integration. There are no elephants on this bridge, we all know this fact. With the dearth of specificities of the bridge’s use at this late stage, not many other reasons emerge that hold water.
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