Our Desk | One Country, Two Straits

Daniel Beitler

In the wake of Tsai Ing-wen’s ascension to the presidency of Taipei, the long-held desire in Beijing that the semi-autonomous models of Macau and Hong Kong would serve as stepping stones to Taiwan’s gradual integration is undoubtedly being called into question again, on both sides of the strait.
For Beijing, the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy implemented in the two Special Administrative Regions has always been guided by the idea that a successful application of this policy might woo Taiwan over to the possibility of national integration. Indeed, it was first conceived by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s as the answer to the troublesome questions posed by the island state.
But the Chinese experiment with local autonomy in Macau and Hong Kong has never managed to entice the Taiwanese as Beijing might have hoped. Instead, Taipei notes with some worry the brazen violations of this policy, particularly in China’s rebellious elder ‘child,’ Hong Kong, and to a lesser extent in its well-behaved younger sibling, Macau.
An increasingly hostile and separatist movement in Hong Kong warranted a visit from Zhang Dejiang this month, accompanied by an assurance that the HKSAR would retain its autonomy as long as it continues to refrain from seeking independence . The senior Chinese leader assured citizens that the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy was here to stay.
Recent incidents, such as the numerous abductions of booksellers and publishers over the past two years, might beg to differ, illustrating the extent to which China is prepared to violate the terms of the Joint Declarations.
Even within Macau and Hong Kong, where freedom of expression is enshrined in the SARs’ respective Basic Laws, Taiwanese citizens must be astonished when they find themselves refused entry to the territories for adorning their travel documents with pro-
independence stickers.
They must conclude that the long arm of China’s influence has extended down into the depths of Macau and Hong Kong’s immigration services, or the services themselves have assumed some bizarre and gratuitous practice of self-censorship.
If Taiwan is watching these developments – and they surely are – what might they be thinking about the prospects of their own island nation adopting the same kind of dual-policy system while preserving their cherished democracy?
They are probably thinking that the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy, like most of the Central Government’s mantras, is ill-defined and not well understood outside of Beijing’s corridors of power, and willfully and nonchalantly flaunted in practice.
Beijing, which has done so much to emphasize its shift to soft power in recent decades, has done just as much to undo that progress in the last few years alone. This shift coincides with the rise of ‘Papa Xi,’ a staunch communist of the worst kind: one who actually believes in communism.
Macau and Hong Kong’s external role as prototypes for Taiwan’s integration into the mainland is flagging, and becoming ever more unconvincing for the Taiwanese people.
In the two SARs, the lack of a representative democracy means that the policy can only be probed outside the public sphere. If the people in Macau and Hong Kong are skeptical that the policy is being applied in earnest, there is little that they can do to restrain or pressure their leaders. In Taiwan, they can force their government to change course; they can elect DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen.