Robert Carroll
How useful it would be to be able single out, among the many messages coming from China about Hong Kong’s political future, those which really count. And given the massive civic upheaval of the last few weeks, how are the decision makers here and in Beijing taking all this on board?
One of the great challenges in political commentary is finding out what are leaders’ bottom lines and whether they may be shifting. In a secretive society such as China this challenge becomes greater. Added to that is the problem of discovering who makes particular decisions and based on whose counsels and the filters of that advice. If those actively pursuing political reform here could know this, and thereby safeguard our freedoms and rights, lobbying and petitioning could be better targeted and perhaps more effective – and media commentary – more revealing.
For example, when the National People’s Congress Standing Committee made its decision on future Chief Executive elections, many observers believe it was handed down in its final form from the central government. If so, how much weight was given to the Standing Committee members’ opinions beforehand, other bodies concerned with One Country two Systems, and how influential were the Hong Kong government recommendations?
Now Chinese President Xi Jinping has long been involved with overseeing Hong Kong affairs, for over 10 years. While tackling the myriad challenges of the world’s most populous nation – and second superpower – while simultaneously cementing his domestic power, it has to be wondered how important Hong Kong is in the larger scheme of things for China, and therefore how much time and attention he can justify giving to the territory’s affairs. After all Hong is now only a few per cent of national GDP, far less than in 1997, and given a continuing high economic growth rate on the mainland, albeit slowing a little, our importance economically is likely to continue on a downward trajectory. However Hong Kong as a threatening center of ideological influence is another matter, which is why the matter of sovereignty and national security has been linked to the election of the Chief Executive.
According to senior Chinese officials, the bottom line for a CE is that he should not oppose Beijing, therefore not call for the end of one party rule. In short do not oppose the Chinese Communist Party / “love” the Country”, therefore, the logic goes; respect sovereignty and national security. So that means in theory that any moderate pan-democrat could run and be elected.
So far so good. Except that under the current and proposed continuation of the election committee, renamed the Nominating Committee, the safety margins for who is deemed to “love” the country would probably exclude any but the safest candidate – safest in terms of who Beijing feels comfortable with and who the local tycoons approve of to maintain their control of most of the private sector economy. Enter the unexpected wild card; students taking over Occupy Central and becoming the new force in local politics.
Getting back to my earlier question, how will the local government and Beijing respond the new Occupy Central political scenario? In two years’ time a new legislature with possibly new party or parties coming from student groups will take some of the places of the current pro-democracy and pro-Beijing lawmakers. What will the government here and in Beijing do to try to assuage or nullify this potent dynamic new force? And will the student leaders of today transform into the effective politicians of tomorrow? For those so young there is remarkable talent and political savvy among the student leaders. Will they be able to do what the old guard in the pro-democracy camp has failed to do and establish more productive lines of communication with the government here and in Beijing? Students gave the more impressive showing when they met the government in a televised public discussion. How much more might they do a few years down the line or will it be plus ça change?
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