Why China rejects spheres of influence

Jorge Costa Oliveira

The Trump administration revived rhetoric built on the idea of a world divided into spheres of influence, echoing the Monroe Doctrine and reasserting ambitions over the Americas. China’s position on this concept has been consistent: it rejects it. While traditional powers such as the United States and the former Soviet Union historically divided the world into blocs, Beijing views that model as outdated and counterproductive. Although China seeks to expand its global influence and is wary of foreign presence near its borders, it does not share a worldview based on rigid territorial control.

One reason lies in the decline of Marxism-Leninism as a unifying global ideology. The fall of the Soviet Union ended a coherent ideological bloc opposing capitalism. Even China has evolved toward a hybrid system, blending Leninist political control with elements of Confucian tradition and nationalism. Today, Beijing’s foreign relations are not driven by ideological solidarity. The Communist Party maintains ties with a wide range of political actors worldwide, including those once seen as adversaries, reinforcing a pragmatic, interest-based diplomacy.

History also shapes China’s stance. The notion of spheres of influence is closely associated with imperialism, when foreign powers carved China into “zones of interest” during the century of humiliation. As a result, Beijing strongly defends sovereignty and non-interference. Supporting spheres of influence would legitimize the idea that major powers can dictate the fate of smaller nations – something China rejects, in part to prevent similar pressure being applied to itself.

Rather than formal alliances, China promotes flexible “strategic partnerships.” Unlike the United States, which relies on extensive defense treaties, Beijing avoids binding commitments that could drag it into unwanted conflicts. This flexibility allows China to maintain relations across geopolitical divides, engaging with countries that may be rivals. By prioritizing trade and investment over military alignment, it preserves autonomy.

China has also shown restraint in exercising power beyond its region. Its sovereignty claims focus mainly on nearby areas such as the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and Taiwan. Despite assertive actions in disputed waters, it has generally avoided military interventions abroad, with the notable exception of the brief 1979 war with Vietnam. In dealing with fragile neighboring states, China has favored economic cooperation and investment rather than direct control.

At a broader level, China advocates for a multipolar world order in which power is more evenly distributed. By rejecting spheres of influence, it presents itself as a leading voice of the developing world, contrasting its approach with what it calls U.S. hegemonism. This positioning is tied to its economic strategy. China’s rise has been built within global trade networks, and closed regional blocs would limit its access to markets and technology.

Initiatives such as the Belt and Road and the expansion of BRICS reflect this approach. Instead of building a bloc of dependent states, China seeks influence through infrastructure, logistics, trade, and investment. As a major industrial and trading power – and still a net importer of food and energy – it depends on diversified global supply chains.

Ultimately, a world divided into spheres of influence would constrain China’s ambitions and economic model. While some analysts argue that Beijing is pursuing regional primacy in Asia, its strategy operates on a global scale. From China’s perspective, recent U.S. rhetoric on spheres of influence is less a structural shift than an attempt to contain its rise internationally.

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