CCAC report | Fong blamed for faulty typhoon forecasting procedures

Fong Soi Kun

The Commission Against Corruption (CCAC) yesterday issued an investigation report on the Macau Meteorological and Geophysical Bureau (SMG)’s typhoon forecasting procedures. The report states that the bureau, when making typhoon forecasts and issuing warning signals for the tropical cyclones, relied on the personal judgments and decisions of then director Fong Soi Kun.

Fong resigned following criticism from residents and lawmakers about the bureau’s failure to raise appropriate typhoon warning signals prior to Typhoon Hato on August 23.

The announcement was made by chief executive, Chui Sai On, the day after the typhoon. Chui said that Fong had retired but was not exempt from investigation. Shortly after, the CCAC announced it was investigating Fong to assess whether the SMG’s typhoon prediction was influenced by external parties. The results of that investigation were released yesterday.

According to the CCAC report, there was no advance discussion or explanation after the typhoons. It was also found that the bureau lacked an internal mechanism for meetings and discussions. When Signal No. 3 or 8 might be issued for a typhoon taking place during non-working hours, Fong would “stay at home and make decisions through phone calls and the internet,” the CCAC stated, adding that “even the personnel of the bureau were not clear about the criteria for the issuance of typhoon warning signals.”

Regarding accurate typhoon forecasting being within the SMG’s area of expertise, the CCAC acknowledged that “it does not have the powers or technical capabilities to make the relevant judgments” and pointed out that “there was no evidence that the SMG’s decisions on issuing tropical cyclone warning signals were subject to external factors either.”

The CCAC cited Fong’s replies to some written inquiries from lawmakers, where he stated that whenever a tropical cyclone warning signal needed to be raised, the leadership, the relevant chiefs and meteorological technicians would meet and make a decision after detailed discussions. However, the CCAC claims that “the SMG did not establish a mechanism for discussions and meetings on typhoon forecasting issues,” relying on decision-making by Fong.

“The forecasters had no idea whether and when a warning signal [was] to be raised before the instructions were received from the director,” the graft watchdog says.

“When said warning signals might be issued during non- working hours or on a public holiday, the deputy director would report the situations only to the director by phone, and the latter would, after analyzing the relevant data and information on the internet at home, decide whether to raise a typhoon warning signal. He would then notify the forecasters on duty at the bureau by phone to publicize the relevant information,” the report read.

“Making typhoon forecasts through ‘decision[s] made at home’ and ‘remote instruction’ were absolutely not the working methods that public departments should adopt to deal with severe natural disasters,” it added.

The report also mentioned the events of the early morning of August 23, when Typhoon Hato started to lash the city. According to the report, Fong went straight into his own office when arriving at the SMG but did not go to the Meteorological Monitoring Centre for an update on the goings-on or exchange ideas with frontline forecasters.

Questioned by the CCAC, Fong said “the forecasters were less experienced than the leaders and the chiefs and their analyses might not be on point.”

Besides, he added, if they had any opinions regarding the issuance of typhoon warning signals, “they should talk to the chief of the Meteorology Division.”

The CCAC disagreed with this procedure, asserting that the weather conditions during a typhoon are ever-changing.

“With only the reports by the chiefs and the use of a computer to monitor and make judgments, it was hardly possible for the former director to [remain updated] about the typhoon in a holistic and timely manner. As typhoon forecasting necessitates the compilation and analysis of a great deal of information in a short period of time, it can by no means solely rely on the wisdom and professionalism of one or only a few people.”

The CCAC also criticized the alleged lack of clear criteria for the issuance of severe weather warning signals, stating that “the leaders and chiefs of the SMG had their own different interpretations of the definitions and standards.”

Other criticism pertains to the internal management of SMG services, which were affected by “a string of problems” such as forecasters that were repeatedly redeployed to other affiliated units.

“[One] forecaster was even redeployed six times within a year. This situation affected the stability of the operations,” the CCAC claims.

The CCAC also noted problems concerning the management of the SMG’s equipment. For example, the internet connection failed frequently, making it impossible to collect any meteorological data during these times. The X-band meteorological radar purchased in 2009 had been non-functional since 2013 due to failure, forcing the SMG to monitor weather conditions through the S-band meteorological radar shared with Zhuhai instead.

Moreover, the SMG’s LIDAR system (Light Detection and Ranging) was purchased earlier this year to monitor air pollution data. After installation, the LIDAR system’s laser light source was discovered to be non-functional as well, but the system has yet to be repaired.

Furthermore, the battery of the SMG’s emergency generator failed after the power outage at noon on August 23, so it did not function immediately as it should have. PB

Decisions based on religious beliefs?

The CCAC investigated whether the religious beliefs of the SMG deputy director (at the time of the facts) had some role in the bureau’s decision-making. The commission says it was difficult to verify whether the rumors on the internet were true or hearsay. “Nevertheless, according to the personnel the CCAC got in touch with, the rumors were widely circulated in the bureau and everyone [had] heard of them,” the report states. The CCAC questioned Fong Soi Kun on the matter. Fong stated that he had never read the posts and therefore did not try to determine if the rumors were true or not. The CCAC makes a judicious comment over Fong’s allegations. “As the highest authority of the SMG, the director should not turn a blind eye to rumors that affect the operations of the bureau, as avoiding the problem will greatly undermine the professional image and credibility of the bureau.”